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Introduction
The term "counterfactual" has a wide range of uses in philosophy, history, economics and statistics.
In philosophy counterfactual scenarios are often used in the analysis of causality, e.g. Lewis (1973) . Pearl (2009) provides an overview of the concepts and develops an analysis of causality based on structural models. In history counterfactuals are posed by "what if" questions, such as "what would the U.S. economy have been like in 1890 had there been no railroads? ", Fogel (1964) . In economics alternative counterfactuals (hypothetical states of the world) are considered in decision making under uncertainty. In statistics and econometrics counterfactuals are used in policy evaluations (e.g. Heckman, 2008 Heckman, & 2010 . The above uses whilst quite distinct are closely connected. However, in this paper we shall focus on the use of counterfactuals in ex post macroeconometric policy evaluation, using the case of quantitative easing after March 2009 in the UK as an example.
By a counterfactual we mean "what would have occurred if some observed characteristics or aspects of the processes under consideration were di¤erent from those prevailing at the time."
For instance, what if the level of a policy variable, x t , is set di¤erently, or what if the parameters of the process that determines x t are changed. In e¤ect, we are interested in comparing an ex post realized outcome with a counterfactual outcome that could have obtained under certain assumptions regarding the policy variable. Such an ex post policy counterfactual policy evaluation exercise di¤ers from ex ante counterfactual analysis that contributes to the decision making leading to adoption of a new policy, in a sense we make precise below.
In the analysis of policy evaluation it is important to distinguish between micro and macro cases. In the former case policy is applied across many di¤erent units decomposed into those a¤ected by policy (the "treated" group) and those that are not (the "untreated" group) within a given time frame. This is the typical case in the microeconometric (micro) policy evaluation, surveyed, for example, by Imbens & Wooldridge (2009) . The other case is where the policy is applied to a single or a few units but over two di¤erent time periods: a "policy o¤" and a "policy on" period. This is the typical case in macroeconometric (macro) policy evaluation. The micro policy evaluation problem has been the subject of a large literature, also known as the treatment e¤ect literature. In contrast, there is less systematic methodological discussion of macro policy evaluation. To be speci…c, suppose that we have units i = 1; 2; :::; N observed over time periods, t = 1; 2; :::; T: In the micro analysis N tends to be large and T small, whereas in the macro analysis N tends to be small and T large, including observations both before and after the policy intervention.
In this paper we consider both the case of many units with a single time period and a single 2 unit with many time periods, but focus on the methodological issues arising from the latter case of an ex post macro policy evaluation exercise. We suppose that the counterfactuals being considered can be generated from an explicit econometric model, such as a simultaneous equations model or a rational expectations model, and emphasise the invariance assumptions required for the validity of such counterfactual exercises. We show that it is important to distinguish between ad hoc policy changes when policy instruments are shocked over one or more time periods, as compared to more fundamental policy interventions where one or more parameters of a policy rule are changed.
Examples of macro counterfactuals are: what was the e¤ect of terrorism on the Basque country? Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003) ; what would have happened to the economies of the UK and the eurozone had the UK joined the euro in 1999? ; what was the e¤ect on growth in Hong Kong of political and economic integration with mainland China? Hsiao, Ching & Wan (2011) ; what was the e¤ect of monetary shocks in the US? Angrist & Kuersteiner (2011) ; what would have been the e¤ect of the Federal Reserve following a di¤erent policy rule? Orphanides & Williams (2011) ; what was the e¤ect of Quantitative Easing in the UK? the case discussed below.
In both microeconometrics and macroeconometrics there have been disputes about the importance of structural modelling for policy evaluation. But what is meant by "structural" di¤ers depending on the problem and context. The microeconometric issues are debated by Imbens (2010) and Heckman (2010) . In macroeconomics, structural models have been identi…ed with DSGE models, of a particular type, which have major limitations in addressing the policy questions that arose after the recent crisis.
We argue that for estimation of policy e¤ects we need to consider conditional models with parameters that are invariant to policy change. A full structural speci…cation is not always necessary and di¤erent types of structures are needed for di¤erent purposes. A structural model that helps identify a particular parameter of interest need not be appropriate for policy analysis where the policy change could initiate direct and indirect impacts on outcomes.
Consider the e¤ects of a change in a policy (intervention) variable, x t , on a target or outcome variable, y t . Suppose that y t and x t can also be a¤ected by a set of control variables, z t ; which need not be invariant to changes in x t : Finally, suppose that there exists a second set of variables, w t , that could a¤ect y t or z t , but are known to be invariant to changes in x t . We argue that for evaluation of the e¤ect of a policy change, we only need to consider a model of y t conditional on
x t and w t . There is no need for a structural model that involves all the four variable types. 1 We do not need to condition on z t but bene…t from conditioning on w t : In considering evaluation, we distinguish between policy changes that alter the parameters of the conditional model, as compared to ad hoc policy changes that do not a¤ect the parameters of the reduced form policy equations.
A simple example of travel mode choice may clarify the issues. Suppose that for a unit of interest (such as an individual, …rm or government) at time t we observe the setting of the policy variable X = x 0 , (go by bus) and the outcome variable Y = y 0 , (bus travel time) and then at time t + 1; we observe X = x 1 , (go by train) and Y = y 1 (train travel time). We also observe certain variables, w t , which are invariant to the decision about the indiviudal's mode of travel.
These might include day of the week, weather on that day, or bus and train timetables. Then for su¢ cient observations in each state and a given set of invariances, we can make probabilistic statements about the values of Y in period t had the individual gone by train rather than by bus. In practice we consider such counterfactuals all the time. When we consider them ex ante, to make the decision whether to travel by bus or by train, we may not know the weather on the day or other variables which in ‡uence travel time on each mode. When we consider them ex post
we have a lot more information about realizations, such as the actual travel times on each mode or the factors in ‡uencing travel times. Ex post we can ask how long the travel time would have been on the travel mode not chosen. In order to make this prediction we do not need to know all factors a¤ecting journey time, those we do not know we treat as part of the random error. Clearly, if we look at the weather forecast before deciding which mode of travel to take, the weather is not invariant and should not be included in the control variates, w t . Prior information about the context is crucial to specifying the counterfactual and the appropriate variables that are relevant to the outcome but invariant to the policy choice.
We begin Section 2 with a consideration of the literature on treatment e¤ects that primarily use the cross-sectional observations, to highlight the di¤erent issues that are involved in the counterfactual analysis of a single unit over time as compared to the counterfactual analysis of many cross section units over a given time interval. We then proceed to the time-series case of counterfactual analysis for a single unit over time in Section 3.
We use the example of quantitative easing (QE) in the UK to illustrate our procedure in 2 Counterfactual analysis across many units Although it is not our primary focus, it is useful to consider the problem of counterfactual analysis in a purely cross-sectional set up to highlight how it di¤ers from the time-series case which is our focus. The cross-sectional studies assume that there are su¢ cient number of units that are subject to the treatment and that the e¤ects of the treatment (if any) are fully materialized over the given observation interval. It is also further assumed that there exists a su¢ cient number of units in a control group who have not been subject to the treatment, but share common characteristics with the treated. In contrast, in pure time series applications there are no control units and the e¤ects of the treatment (policy) might be distributed over time and could be subject to reversal.
Identi…cation of the treatment e¤ect using cross-sectional data
Suppose that a continuous target (or outcome) variable, y i ; and a vector of exogenous covariates, w i ; are observed for a sample of i = 1; 2; :::; N units (individuals) in a given time period, and there is a discrete policy treatment denoted by a dummy variable x i that takes the value of unity if individual i is treated, and zero for the untreated. Denote the outcomes for the treated individuals by y T i T ; i T = 1; 2; :::; N T ; and for the untreated ones by y U i U ; i U = 1; 2; :::; N U , so that N = N T +N U : We distinguish the index, i T or i U ; to emphasise that we are considering the observed outcomes for di¤erent units not the actual and counterfactual outcomes for the same unit. To estimate the e¤ect of treatment, we require observations on both treated and untreated. If the proportion treated is p = N T =N we require that 0 < p < 1; or more generally if p(w i ) = p(x i = 1 j w i ) is the probability of treatment conditional on covariates, we require 0 < p(w i ) < 1: This assumption ensures that for each value of w i there are both treated and untreated units. Given data on x i and w i ; the propensity score p(w i ) can be estimated.
We provide a formulation that relates easily to the time-series case and for simplicity assume a single covariate, but allow the parameters to be randomly heterogeneous and distributed independently of the covariate. 2 Speci…cally, we assume that (2011) consider the case of correlated random coe¢ cient models.
5 Using x i = 1 for the treated units and x i = 0 for the untreated, the model can be written compactly as
It is clear that the treatment e¤ect, ; can only be identi…ed if T = U = ; namely that if there are no systematic di¤erences between the two groups apart from the treatment. Under this condition, we have
The above assumptions require that treatment, x i = 1; should not be correlated with characteristics of the treated or the covariates, and that for the treated the covariates are not correlated with the characteristics of the treated. The assumptions could fail if the assignment or selection into the treatment or non-treatment groups was on the basis of the individual component of the treatment e¤ect, v i ; or their intercept, T i . The correlation of x i with v i or T i has been a major focus of the microeconometric literature.
If T = U = ; and T and U are homogenous, we can write (1)
, and the least squares estimate of in (3) is given bŷ
b T is the estimated regression coe¢ cient on the treated sample and b U is the regression coe¢ cient on the untreated sample. The estimate of^ is the di¤erence between the estimated intercepts 6 from the two separate OLS regressions for the treated and the untreated. This brings out the role of the identifying assumption, T = U , which enables us to test if the e¤ect of the treatment is statistically signi…cant.
3 Counterfactual analysis for a single unit over time
A rational expectations framework
We now consider a policy evaluation problem where the aim is to estimate the "average" e¤ect of a policy intervention, given time-series data for a single unit for both "policy o¤" and "policy on" periods. Given that we are considering a single unit and the objective is to measure the e¤ect of the intervention on that unit, the selection problem discussed above will not arise.
We begin by abstracting from model and parameter estimation uncertainty, these are important in practice but are not speci…c to the issues of counterfactuals. We do, however, allow for the possibility that the policy intervention might change some of the model parameters in the context of a rational expectations model. We suppose that the single target or outcome variable y t is affected directly by a single policy variable x t and one or more control variates, z t . We also assume that there exists a set of variables, w t , that a¤ect y t or z t but are invariant to changes in x t and As noted earlier, it is important that we distinguish the cases where there is an exogenous, ad hoc, change in x t from the case where there is a change in the process determining x t : Let
, and suppose that the endogenous variables, q t , are determined by the following rational expectations model
where E t (q t+1 ) = E(q t+1 j I t ); and I t is the non-decreasing information set, I t = (q t ; s t ; q t 1 ; s t 1 ; ::::).
The processes generating the elements of s t are given by
so that w t is invariant to changes in x t and q t : The errors, u t and v t have means zero, constant variances, and E(u t v 0 t ) = 0. The RE model could result from some well de…ned decision problem, and can be extended to allow for dynamics. But it is su¢ ciently general for our purposes.
We assume that apart from possible changes in the process determining x t ; that is changes in x ; the model is stable in that the structural parameters (A 0 ; A 1 ; A 2 ) are policy and time invariant. We will also require that certain parameters, such as = (
There is a unique stationary solution if all the eigenvalues of Q = A 1 0 A 1 lie within the unit circle. The unique solution is given by
and R is de…ned by s t = Rs t 1 + v st :
Equation (5) 
Therefore, for the analysis of ad hoc changes in the policy variable knowledge of structural parameters is not necessary, and the analysis can be based on the policy reduced form equation which for y t is given by
Suppose that a policy intervention is announced at the end of period T for the periods T + 1; T + 2; :::; T + H. The intervention is such that the "policy on" realized values of the policy variable are di¤erent from the "policy o¤" counterfactual which would have happened in the absence of the intervention. De…ne, the information set available at time t as T = fy t ; x t ; z t ; w t for t = T; T 1; T 2; ::::g: The realized policy values are: T +h (x) = fx T +1 ; x T +2 ; :::; x T +h g:
The counterfactual policy values are: T +h (x 0 ) = fx 0 T +1 ; x 0 T +2 ; :::; x 0 T +h g: Ex ante policy evaluation is relatively straightforward and can be carried out by comparing the e¤ects of two alternative sets of policy values, say T +h (x 0 ) and T +h (x 1 ), or 0 T +h and 1 T +h , for short. Notice that the expected sequence with "policy on" 1 T +h will di¤er from the realized sequence T +h ; by implementation errors. The expected e¤ects of "policy on" T +h (x 1 ) relative to "policy o¤" T +h (x 0 ) is given by
+h ); h = 1; 2; :::; H
The evaluation of these expectations critically depends on the type of invariances assumed. These invariances would include whether the announced policy is credible, and whether the parameters would change.
In the context of the above stylized model, the e¤ects of ad hoc changes in the policy variable are given by
T +h , for h = 1; 2; :::; H:
The policy reduced form equation, (7), is clearly mis-speci…ed if the objective is to estimate the structural parameters. But for the counterfactual analysis, it is the total e¤ect of the policy change which is needed, and this parameter is consistently estimated by the regression of y on x and w.
Under the assumption that w t , the policy reduced form parameters ( 1 and 2 ), and the errors, v yt , are invariant to policy interventions we have the simple result that for h = 1; 2; ::: the e¤ect of policy is:
It is clear that this result does not require the invariance of the structural parameters, but only that the policy reduced form parameters are invariant to policy intervention.
In cases where w t and v yt are invariant to the policy change but the parameters are not (possibly due to expectational e¤ects as in (6) ) we have
The parameters are treated as random variables since they may be changed by policy. In practice, the potential e¤ects of policy change on the parameters must also be modelled. In the case of the rational expectations models the dependence of 1 and 2 on the policy parameters can be used to compute the expressions E 1 1 T +h , E 1 0 T +h , and E 2 1
T +h E 2 0 T +h . There are a number of advantages in basing the policy analysis directly on the policy reduced form equation (7). Using a full structural model for policy evaluation requires that all parameters are invariant to the policy intervention, but there may be circumstances, where the total e¤ect is more likely to be invariant to the intervention than the marginal e¤ects captured by the structural parameters. A policy reduced form equation of the type discussed above is likely to be more robust to the invariance assumption than a fully structural model. There may also be cases where it is more e¢ cient to estimate the total e¤ect directly, rather than indirectly from the full structural model. Estimating the full system of equations may be more sensitive to speci…cation errors, as compared to the policy reduced form equation.
Allowing for dynamics
While equation (7) is a static model, the above analysis can be extended to dynamic models, with the di¤erence that the counterfactual has to be computed recursively from the policy date, T , onward. When dynamic e¤ects are included in the RE model, (4), the solution can be written as a general autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model in y t ,x t and w t , (after solving out the e¤ects of z t ) y t = (L)y t 1 + 1 (L)x t + 0 2 (L)w t + v yt ; for t = 1; 2; :::; T; T + 1; :::; T + H where (L) = 1 L + 2 L 2 + ::: + p L p ; and j (L) = a j0 + a j1 L + :::: + a jq j L q j , j = 1; 2:
As before T = fy t ; x t ; z t ; w t for t = T; T 1; T 2; ::::g, and two policy counterfactuals are 0 T +h = fx 0 T +1 ; x 0 T +2 ; :::; x 0 T +h g, and 1 T +h = fx 1 T +1 ; x 1 T +2 ; :::; x 1 T +h g: To illustrate how d T +h can be derived in this case we consider the following simple speci…cation y t = y t 1 + 10 x t + 11 x t 1 + 0 2 w t + v yt ; for t = 1; 2; :::; T; T + 1; :::; T + H
and note that
Evaluating the e¤ect of policy conditional on T gives
Since, w t is invariant to the policy change we have
which is a direct generalization of the static formulation.
The unknown parameters in the policy e¤ects, d T +h , can be computed using the policy reduced form equation. Assuming T is large, the parameters can be estimated either from the sample before the intervention, t = 1; 2; :::T or from the whole sample available, t = 1; 2; :::T + H: We also need to consider the possible endogeneity of x t : Suppose that the policy variable x t is generated by
with v yt and v xt being correlated. To correct for the endogeneity, following Pesaran & Shin (1999) , we model the contemporaneous correlation between v yt and v xt ; by v yt = v xt + t , where by construction v xt and t are uncorrelated The parametric correction for the endogenous x t is equivalent to augmenting the ARDL speci…cation with an adequate number of lagged changes in
x t before estimation of the policy reduced form equation is carried out.
A test for policy e¤ectiveness
In many cases we will want to make statements about the probability of policy being e¤ective or test the hypothesis that the policy had no e¤ect, we now consider this issue. Returning to the simple static speci…cation, we noted above that the ex ante estimate of the e¤ect of policy would be d (ex ante) T +h
However, ex post the realizations of policy variable might not coincide with the planned or intended values of x, and we would have
where 1 T +h and x 1 T +h ; the expected values of the policy variable given information at time t, may di¤er from the realisations T +h and x T +h ; because of implementation errors.
We can also calculate the di¤erence between the realized values of the outcome variable in the "policy on" period with the counterfactual for the outcome variable with "policy o¤": 
Unlike the ex ante measure of the policy e¤ects, the ex post measure given above depends on the value of the realized shock, v y;T +h , and the statistical analysis of the e¤ectiveness of the policy require relatively large post policy samples so that the in ‡uence of the random component can be minimized.
The ex post mean e¤ect of the policy is given by
One could develop a test of d H = 0, using an estimator of 1 ; b 1 for T and H su¢ ciently large.
In the case where H=T ! 0 as T ! 1, a test of the policy e¤ectiveness hypothesis can be based
is a measure of the average size of the policy change. The policy-e¤ectiveness test statistic can now be written as
where^ vy is the standard error of the policy reduced form regression.
Unconventional monetary policy: an empirical application
We will illustrate the proposed approach to single-unit counterfactual analysis with a consideration of the e¤ect of unconventional monetary policies, UMP, such as quantitative easing, QE. In practice, UMP have tended to be adopted when central banks have hit the zero lower bound for the policy interest rate, but in principle they could be adopted even interest rates are not at the lower bound. The term quantitative easing was used by the Bank of Japan to describe its policies In the UK QE involved exchanging one liability of the state -government bonds (gilts) -for another -claims on the central bank. That change in the quantities of the two assets would cause a rise in the price of guilts, decline in their yields, but also cause a rise in the prices of substitute assets such as corporate bonds and equities. The Bank of England believed 5 that QE boosts demand by increasing wealth and by reducing companies'cost of …nance. It also increases banks liquidity and may prompt more lending. Event studies documented in Joyce et al. (2011) suggest that QE reduced the spread of long over short term government interest rates (the "spread") by 100 basis points from its introduction in March 2009. Thus the counterfactual we consider is the e¤ect of a 100 basis points reduction in the spread, x t ; on output growth, y t : Notice that this is what we called above an ad hoc intervention changing the level of the policy variable, as distinct from an intervention changing the parameters of a policy rule.
The data is taken from the Global VAR dataset, recently extended to 2011Q2. 6 Growth, y t ;
is measured by the quarterly change in the logarithm of real GDP. In calculating the spread, the short and long interest rates are expressed as 0:25 log(1 + R=100); where R is the annual percent rate. Figure 1 plots UK output growth and the spread over the full sample period 1979Q2-2011Q2.
The estimate that QE reduced the spread by 100 basis points is not uncontroversial, Meaning
and Zhu (2011) estimate a smaller impact of about 25 basis points, but our estimates could be easily scaled downwards to match this alternative estimate. Kapetanios et al (2012) , who examine the e¤ects of QE on UK output growth and in ‡ation, also use a reduction in spread of 100 basis points. In their analysis they are particularly concerned about structural change and use three time-varying VAR models that allow for the parameter change in di¤erent ways, but do not consider the possible e¤ects of QE on other z t type variables. Baumeister and Benati (2010) also use time varying VARs to assess the macroeconomic e¤ects of QE in the US and UK, assuming the e¤ect of QE in the UK was to reduce the spread by 50 basis points. But as our theoretical analysis highlights, the e¤ects of structural breaks due to factors other than the policy change must be distinguished from the structural breaks that could result from the policy intervention.
These studies are concerned with past parameter variations and implicitly assume that the policy intervention has no independent e¤ects on parameter values.
Here we re-examine the e¤ects of QE on UK output growth, and for reasons explained in the theoretical part of the paper we shall be using the policy reduced form approach rather than a full structural model. Like Kapetanios et al. (2012) we assume that QE caused a 100 basis points reduction in the spread. 7 We do not rule out that QE might have had an impact on other variables, such as z t , with indirect e¤ects on output growth. But we recall that such z t -e¤ects are solved out and are indirectly accommodated in our approach. G 7 It is assumed that the reduction in spreads is permanent. But other time pro…les for the policy e¤ects of QE on spreads could also be considered.
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As for the choice of the conditioning variables, w t , we use foreign output variables as they are unlikely to have been signi…cantly a¤ected by UK QE, but their inclusion allows for the possible indirect e¤ects of unconventional monetary policies implemented in US and euro area on UK output growth. Figure 2 plots UK and US output growths, Figure 3 , UK and euro output growths. Like Kapetanios et al. (2012) we assume that the reduction in the spread is permanent.
But other time pro…les for the policy e¤ects of QE on spreads could also be considered. Again such modi…cations can be readily accommodate within our framework.
We …rst use a bivariate ARDL in output growth (y t ) and the spread between long and short interest rates (x t ). Pesaran and Shin (1999) show that ARDL estimates are robust to endogeneity and robust to the fact that y t (stationary) and x t (near unit root) have di¤erent degrees of persistence. The bivariate ARDL may be more robust to structural change, than models with a large number of variables and may reduce forecast uncertainty due to estimation error. The ARDL is also preferable to VAR models for counterfactual analysis since it allows e¢ ciency gains by conditioning on contemporaneous policy variables.
A bivariate ARDL model with lag orders automatically selected by AIC (or SBC), gives model M1:
We consider two samples, both starting in 1980Q3, one ending estimation in 2008Q4, the last data available before QE, the other ending estimation in 2011Q2. 8 With structural instability there is an issue of whether the variance or the mean shifts. When error variances are falling, as occurred during the period before the …nancial crisis (the so-called great moderation), it is optimal to place more weights on the most recent observations. Pesaran, Pick and Pranovich (2011) .
Both model M1 equations pass tests for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, fail (at the 5% level) tests for normality and functional form. The equation estimated up to 2008Q4, passes predictive failure and parameter stability tests. In all the speci…cations, it is the change in spread that seems important. The impact of the policy tends to erode quite rapidly (within less than a year) with the long-run e¤ect of the spread on output growth not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. This is apparent from Figure 4 , where the model M1 predictions for growth using realised and counterfactual spread converge quite quickly. A similar picture also emerges from Charts 2 and 3 of Kapetanios et al. (2012) where the 100 basis point counterfactual returns to the model prediction within about a year , although they do not highlight this aspect of their results. Notice that as is clear from a comparison of (11) and (13) We can improve the e¢ ciency of estimation by conditioning on foreign output growth variables.
Over the full sample the correlation between UK growth and US growth is 0.47, in the post 1999 sample it is 0.76. For euro growth, the correlations are 0.36 and 0.73. Thus we augment the ARDL with current euro and US growth rates. In terms of the earlier notation w t = (y U S t ; y Euro t ) 0 . The estimated equation is model M2:
The …t is rather better than the bivariate ARDL and again the equations pass tests for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, fail (at the 5% level) tests for normality and functional form.
The equation estimated up to 2008Q4, passes predictive failure and parameter stability tests. We cannot reject 10 + 11 = 0 on the full sample. This restriction is imposed in the simulations reported below. Although the long-run e¤ect is very close to zero in both models, the impact e¤ect is rather smaller when one allows for foreign growth, 0. Figure 5 compares the predictions for output growth using realized and counterfactual spreads based on model M2, the ARDL model that includes US and euro output growth. Figure 6 compares the counterfactual forecasts using the two models, M1 and M2, with and without foreign output growth. Figure 7 also includes the actual UK output growth rate. Conditional on US and euro growth rates the impact e¤ect of QE is a little smaller. Overall, a 100 basis points increase in spreads reduces growth by somewhat less than 1% on impact, but while the e¤ect on the spread is assumed permanent, the e¤ect on growth is temporary and gets reversed quite quickly.
We also considered the application of the policy ine¤ectiveness test statistic given by (14) to the current problem, but due to the rapid reversal of the policy e¤ects we found the test not to be statistically signi…cant, suggesting that the average e¤ect of the policy computed even over a 2-3 years time horizon will be zero. This is compatible with the policy having a statistically signi…cant impact e¤ect without the average policy e¤ect being statistically signi…cant if computed over a longer time period.
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Conclusion
For evaluation of treatments or policy interventions structural identi…cation is not required. What is needed is identi…cation of the parameters of the policy equation where the e¤ects of the covariates that are in ‡uenced by the policy are solved out. Strong parameter and error invariance assumptions are also needed. We distinguish between ex ante evaluation, which uses predicted policy and outcomes, and ex post evaluation, which uses realizations of policy and outcomes, and highlight the importance of conditioning on the variables that explain the outcomes but are invariant to policy interventions. We also consider the di¤erences between the micro treatment literature and the time series policy evaluation exercises. Although we do not discuss it, the approach adopted here naturally extends to panel data where one has time series for a number of units some of whom are subject to the policy intervention, with all the units observed both before and after the policy intervention.
We illustrate some of the issues that arise in counterfactual policy evaluation with an empirical application to Quantitative Easing which was introduced in the UK in March 2009. The UK QE involved exchanging one liability of the state -government bonds (gilts) -for another -claims on the central bank. That change in the quantities of the two assets would cause a rise in the price of guilts, decline in their yields, but also cause a rise in the prices of substitute assets such as corporate bonds and equities. We estimate two models explaining UK output growth over two sample periods, one ending in 2008Q4 (before QE), and the other ending in 2011Q2. Model M1 is a bivariate dynamic equation between growth and the spread of long interest rates over short interest rates, model M2 adds US and euro area output growth to model M1.
Although there is some dispute about the size of the e¤ect of QE on interest rate spreads, we follow the Bank of England in assuming that QE caused a permanent 100 basis points reduction in the spread of long interest rates over short interest rates after March 2009. Both models and both sample periods indicate that it is the change in spread that matters: there is a signi…cant impact e¤ect of QE but this e¤ect tends to disappear quite quickly, certainly within a year. In all cases the long-run e¤ect is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Although the long-run e¤ect of the change in the spread on output growth is not emphasized by Kapetanios et al. (2012) , the estimates they provide for the time pro…les of the e¤ects of the QE tell very much the same story, namely the bene…cial e¤ects of QE are rather short-lived. The size of the impact e¤ect of the 100 basis points reduction in the spread on the output growth rate is between three quarters of a percentage point and one percentage point, with the lower estimate coming from the model that includes foreign output growth. Thus while the estimated change in the spread caused by QE, if sustained, would have permanent distributional e¤ects between savers and borrowers, the change in spread only generated a temporary stimulus to growth. This raises a number of policy issues.
These include the costs and bene…ts of a permanent change in spread relative to a temporary stimulus to growth, the optimal timing for a temporary stimulus and the e¤ects of the eventual reversal of QE. Counterfactual Output Growths based on Models without (blue) and with (red) US and Euro Output Growths 
UK Output
